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Abstract
We estimate the elasticity of charitable giving with respect to price and income
changes using a rich panel of income tax returns covering the period 2001 to 2006. Em-
ploying censored quantile regression and exploiting the panel structure, the advantage
of our analysis is twofold: First, we derive results for different points in the underlying
distribution of charitable giving and allow for giving to be heterogeneous. Thus, we do
not only estimate responses of giving to prices and incomes but also where the incen-
tives matter most. Second, we disentangle long-run responses to persistent changes in
price and income from temporary reactions, consumption smoothing, or tax planning.
Indeed, our results suggest that price elasticity is heterogenous across the distribution
of donors and that the persistent price elasticity is close to one in absolute value at the
upper and lower tail of the distribution of charitable giving.
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1 Introduction
A common feature of income tax codes is the favorable tax treatment of charitable giving.
Whether these tax incentives are suitable to boost charitable giving and whether tax incen-
tives are an efficient policy instrument is an ongoing debate (Peloza and Steel 2005).1 On
that account, the last decades have seen a lively interest in the theoretical, empirical and
experimental analysis on the motives of charitable giving and responses of donors to the key
issues of tax incentives. The scale to which tax incentives are suitable to raise donations
depends if they are price elastic, and if so, to what extent. One straight forward reason to
investigate price and income elasticities is to establish, whether tax reliefs are effective to
stimulate giving to the extant that they offset forgone tax revenues, which could otherwise
have been used to provide public goods directly (Feldstein and Clotfelter 1975, Feldstein
1980). However, this fiscal rule might be relaxed when taking an overall welfarist point
of view and for example allowing the donor to derive utility from the act of giving per se
(Andreoni 1990).2
Following Taussig’s (1967) seminal study analyzing US tax return data, numerous approaches
were conducted. A review of 69 empirical studies covering five decades conducted by Peloza
and Steel (2005) leads to ambiguous findings, mainly due to a number of technical reasons.
For example, a large share of taxpayers might not donate at all, thus the problem of censoring
demands models like the Tobit. However, that comes at the price that potential individual
fixed effects cannot be eliminated by first differences. Moreover, recent results suggest that
donors behave very heterogenous along the distribution of donations and models like Tobit
can only capture the conditional mean, but not to present the whole distribution of reactions.
Furthermore, results from Tobit models might be only driven from a fraction of the population
and could be only representative on average.3 Peloza and Steel (2005) also highlight how
results are driven from heterogenous data sources, statistical methods and different time
periods. In addition, recent results are mainly obtained from panel data.4
In sum, most studies reviewed by Peloza and Steel (2005) support the hypothesis that tax
deductions for charitable giving are treasury efficient. However, more recent studies have
provided a different picture. Based on either panel data or alternative estimation methods,
1Donations to charity also offer a chance to investigate tax noncompliance (see Feldman and Slemrod
(2007).
2There is a large literature estimating utility from giving, see for instance Crumpler and Grossman (2008)
for an experimental investigation.
3Linear models like Tobit might also deliver inconsistent results in case of a non-linear process and results
could be driven from outliers.
4See, for instance, Clotfelder (1980), Barrett (1991), Auten et al. (2002) for results for the US from
analyses with panel data.
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they find that previous studies might have overestimated the price elasticity (Bakija and Heim
2011) or even that giving behavior qualifies as price inelastic (Fack and Landais 2010).5
In the current study we use panel data recently available for Germany to complement the
aforementioned research and previous studies investigating the German case. For Germany,
several studies establish the giving behavior to be price and income elastic. Using aggregated
cross-sectional income tax data, Paqué (1986) finds average giving behavior to be price and
income elastic. These result are also supported by more recent findings of Auer and Kalusche
(2010). Based on micro level cross-sectional income tax data they establish price and income
elastic behavior for high and low income classes. They face the censoring issue by deploying
Tobit and thus estimated elasticities are again population averages. Taking into account
the possibility of heterogonous giving behavior, Bönke et al. (2013) derive estimates from a
censored quantile regression approach which confirms price and income elastic behavior in
parts of the distribution of donors. Adena (2014), in the spirit of Bakija and Heim (2011)
and also making use of the recent available tax panel data, estimates a panel fixed effect OLS
model for four different income groups. Her results suggest no income elastic behavior but
very different price elasticities across income groups.
Exploiting the panel structure of our data, we estimate price and income elasticities while
disentangling persistent and transitory effects of giving behavior. In addition, we follow
Fack and Landais (2010) and Bönke et. al (2013) in applying the non-parametric estimation
technique of quantile regression to derive estimates at different points of the conditional
distribution of charitable giving. In short, our approach is not restricted to answer whether
current tax incentives are suitable to foster charitable giving but also aims at determining for
whom tax incentives matter most. The current study can thus complement former research in
three ways. First, the estimation technique helps us to connect the amount given to income
and price elasticities, rather than obtaining an estimate for the population average. This
matters if giving behavior is indeed heterogenous as suggested by Bönke et al.(2013) and
only the tails of the conditional distribution are price elastic. This has direct implications for
the optimal design of tax incentives: the tax induced price of giving should hinge upon the
amount given rather than the tax rate. Moreover, results confirm that the income elasticity
of donations is declining with increasing donations which supports the general assumption
that donations to charity are a normal good. Second, our data highly over-samples top
incomes and presents results including the highest incomes.6 Keeping in mind that there is a
large literature suggesting severe differences in various aspects between top incomes and the
5Fack and Landais (2010) find price elasticities for French taxpayers to range between -0.2 and -0.6. Thus
they are inelastic to price incentives and heterogenous.
6Bönke et. al (2013) do not include gross incomes above 153,000 Euro.
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remaining income distribution, this is a valuable asset. For example, Bach et. al (2013) show
income sources and effective taxation are distinct for top income earners in Germany. Hence,
this might also suggest distinct behavioral responses to tax incentives (e.g. tax planning)
and especially for donations to charity for this income group.
Third, for the first time we use panel data to differentiate between persistent and transitory
changes in income and prices in this kind of econometric setting. The remainder of the chapter
is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses briefly the conceptual framework regarding the
efficiency of tax incentives. Section 3.3 describes the data and its preparation. Section 3.4
presents the main results of our econometric exercise and section 4.5 concludes by reviewing
key findings.
2 Efficiency of Tax Incentives
The optimal theoretical design of tax incentives has been discussed in the literature exten-
sively.7 Depending on the modeling of philanthropy, a range of efficient setups to encourage
charitable giving can be derived. The modeling may for instance allow for crowding out,
impure altruism or warm glow of giving. Therefore, we will briefly review some theoretically
founded results to define treasury-efficient policies relevant for our study. In the standard
approach, individuals donate voluntarily some amount to the public good. In absence of gov-
ernment activity (no public contributions to the public good and no tax incentives regarding
donations), the total of private donations amount to the level of the publicly provided good
and, following Samuelson’s famous rule (Samuelson 1954), this level will be inefficiently low.
If government activities try to raise the privately provided charity to an efficient level, it faces
the challenge of crowding out. Either crowding out will be next to complete or the individuals
gain utility not only from the public good but from the act of giving per se (Andreoni 1990).
Unfortunately, in contrast to Bönke et al. (2013), the case of crowding out can due to data
limitations not be considered.8
Besides providing for the public good directly, the government can introduce tax incentives to
boost voluntary contribution by lowering the price of giving. Hence, whether tax incentives
work as desired hinges on the price elasticity of giving. Not taking the possibility of crowding
out into account, this leads to Feldstein’s rule of treasury efficiency (Feldstein 1975): Tax
incentives are classified as effective in terms of “treasury efficient” if the tax-defined price
elasticity is greater than one (in absolute value) and therefore more than offsets each dollar
7See for instance Feldstein and Clotfelter (1975), Feldstein (1980), Andreoni (1990) and Seaz (2004).
8Information on the federal state of residency which is needed to control for crowding out is due to
confidential restrictions not available for taxpayers with an average total income above 165,000 Euro.
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To derive meaningful tax policy recommendation from an empirical exercise, some important
assumptions regarding the underlying utility function are needed (Saez 2004). First, utility
depends on net-of-tax gross income at the individual level and income effects arise only from
net-of-tax gross income. Second, the level of the contributions to charity and the tax price
of giving do not affect gross income before taxes. Third, changes of the tax rate affect
income elastic responses of contributions only to the extent the net-of-tax gross income is
affected. Under these assumption, in the presence of price elastic behavior and in the absence
of crowding out, the rule for assessing the effectiveness of tax incentives follows the rule by
Feldstein (e.g., Feldstein 1975 and Saez 2004). It is essential for the empirical assessment to
identify if reactions to prices are persistent or transitory. Only persistent price elasticities
can be used to indicate the efficiency of the tax treatment. While transitory adjustments are
caused by the re-timing of giving due to non-permanent price or income shocks, efficiency
hinges on the permanent responses to incentives. In the case of a diverging permanent and
transitory price elasticity the optimal rule asks for the permanent price elasticity to be greater
than one (in absolute value).
3 Data and Institutional Setting
All information generated in the process of taxation is documented in the taxpayer’s income
tax return. All relevant information on the family situation, the declaration of income from
different sources, granted deductions (including donations) and exemptions, calculation of
taxable income and personal income tax payment are included. We can observe several socio-
economic characteristics of taxpayers such as age, number of children, church membership
and marital status. Unfortunately, liable information about the gender of the taxpayer is
not provided. Albeit recorded, validating the information for single and married tax units
reveals the accuracy to be insufficient. The German Federal Statistical Office assembles
the income tax returns electronically as Income Tax Statistics, providing the basis for the
German Taxpayer Panel (TPP). The Income Tax Statistic is collected every year and in
order to form the TPP, consecutive years are linked by exploiting the individual taxpayer’s
ID and a balanced panel is compiled. The panel contains individual income tax returns of 19
million observations, covering years 2001 to 2006. However, in very few cases this procedure
9In the case of crowding out or warm glow of giving this efficiency rule is relaxed (e.g. Saez, 2004).
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does not yield a perfect match. In the event of marriage, divorce or moving to another federal
state, individual taxpayer’s ID will be reissued or changed. On basis of four stratification
criteria, i.e. federal state, assessment type, main type of income and total income, a 5%
sample is drawn and made available for scientific purposes. The stratification procedure
aims at optimizing the sample with regard to standard errors of total income over time and
according observation weights are generated.
In Germany, two basic rules for donations are in place. The first rule applies to contribution
that are regarded to be beneficial to the common good (e.g. donation to charity organisations,
to churches, science or culture). In this case, donations are deductable from the tax base
up to a certain limit.10 Thus, the implicit price of giving one Euro equals one minus the
marginal tax rate (see Figure 1). The second rule concerns donations to political parties.
Here, for every donated Euro the donor gets a tax cut of fifty cents (and the price of giving
is the same for all donors). For several reasons we are only concerned with the first rule and
the resulting tax-defined prices of giving for 2001, 2004 and 2005 are presented in Figure 1.11
The price of giving varies over time and across taxable income. For taxable incomes below
the basic allowance the price is one, than it gradually decreases to almost 0.5 in 2001 for
taxpayers in the highest income bracket. As the tax price of giving mirrors the tax tariff,
the tax reforms of 2004 and 2005 increased the tax defined price of giving substantially and
especially in the top income bracket from 0.515 in 2003 to 0.58 in 2005.
10In 2004, the maximal amount of charitable contributions eligible for deduction are 5% of total income
(Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte).
11Contribution to political parties have to be evaluated differently. For example, political parties are not
considered per se a charity and most donation are from party members and the motive for party membership
can hardly be considered charitable.
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Furthermore, the German tax code provides a blanket allowance for personal expenses and
the tax price of giving is only lower one if itemized deductions exceed the blanket allowance.12
Taxpayers that do not exceed their blanket allowance, thus do not itemize but donate have a
tax price of giving of one. Consequently, those donations are not audited by tax authorities
and the data on those donation are not reliable. The overall impact of this group can be
considered negligible regarding the fiscal relevance, hence we exclude these observations.
Further, we assume that they are not different from taxpayers that remain in the sample and
our results do not suffer from selection bias.
Another sub-population of taxpayers, the borderline itemizers, are taxpayers that only exceed
their blanket allowance because of their donations to charity. However, only the donations
that exceed the blanket allowance are deductable from taxable income and only those have a
tax price below one. We follow the literature by excluding those taxpayers which is standard
and not harmful to our results since they are only a relatively small group of 0.18%.
Donations to charity can increase the marginal price of giving which induces a potential endo-
geneity of the price of giving for a progressive tax schedule.13 The more an individual gives,
12The blanket allowance is relative small with 36 Euro for a single taxpayer and 72 Euro for a married
taxpayer.
13See Triest (1998) about a discussion of possible ways for taxpayers to influence their marginal tax rate
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the potentially lower is the marginal tax rate and higher the tax price. One way to avoid the
potential endogeneity is taking the price of the first donated Euro (Peloza and Steel 2005).
Another strategy is to calculate the (endogenous) average price and instrument it with the
price of the first Euro donated. Both strategy are employed here and we find the results to
be robust to both approaches. This does not come as a surprise as calculated prices do not
differ very much and especially for tax payers in the top income bracket both strategies yield
to the same tax price of giving. Following the literature we report only results based on the
tax price for the first Euro donated. The core sample for the analysis consists of observation
from four assessment years, 2002 to 2005. Thereby we obtain for every year one lag and
one future year.14 Each year consists of 928,993 taxpayers resulting in a balanced panel of
3,715,972 observations. Summing up, we exclude the following taxpayers to obtain a sam-
ple with reliable information: First, taxpayers with exceptional capital gains and taxpayers
with incomes that are not fully taxed in Germany (2.45% or 91,244 observations). Further,
taxpayers that have negative taxable income in one year (18.8% or 697,544 observations),
boarderline itemizers (0.18% or 6,760 observations) and non-itemizing taxpayers (19.67% or
730,541 observations). All in all, pooling our balanced panel we obtain an unweighted sample
containing 2,189,883 taxpayers for the period 2002 to 2005.15
Table 1 presents some sample descriptive statistics. The left panel shows mean and standard
deviations including weighting factors for the weighted sample of 44 million taxpayers and
the right panel shows unweighted descriptive results for the estimation sample only. 67.7% of
taxpayers in the estimation sample donate to charity, which corresponds to 55% of weighted
observations. 67% of taxpayers are married and the average marginal tax rate of donors
equals the average marginal tax rate of taxpayers that do not donate with 0.30. The log
price is on average -0.48, while log income is on average 11.
through economic activities.
14The sample encompasses assessment years 2001 to 2006.
15Note that the term taxpayer denotes both married and single tax units. In case of a married taxpayer,
this refers to two persons.
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Table 1: Sample Descriptives
Weighted Unweighted
Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Share of Donors 0.55 (0.497) 0.677 (0.467)
Share of Married 0.68 (0.466) 0.674 (0.469)
Share of Church Members 0.74 (0.439) 0.724 (0.447)
Share of Taxpayers with Children 0.80 (0.400) 0.795 (0.404)
Marginal tax rate 0.30 (0.106)









Number of Observations 43,702,689 2,189,883
Note: Descriptive Results are produced from the sample including weighting factors. pit denotes
the logarithm of the tax price of giving, yit is the logarithm of the net-of-tax gross income, ∆
denotes the growth rate.
Source: Own computation based on TPP 2001-2006.
4 Empirical estimation
The standard model of donations to charity, Git in time period t for taxpayer i, models giving
depending on the adjusted net-of-tax gross income Yit− T (Xit),16 the price of giving Pit and
socio-demographics contained in zit.17
Git = G (Yit − T (Xit), Pit, zit) (2)
Note that this equation models donations to charity as a consumption good including income
effects arising from the adjusted net-of-tax gross income (henceforth referred to as net in-
come) and price effects from the tax price of giving. However, to identify both, the net income
cannot be perfectly correlated with prices but needs sufficient variation. We ensure that vari-
ation by constructing an adjusted income by re-including individual tax reliefs, allowances
and specific depreciations, tax free earnings and tax motivated losses. This approach is sim-
ilar to Bach et. al (2009), Bönke et. al (2013) and Bönke et. al (2007). Further information
16Yit depicts adjusted gross income, Xit taxable income and T (·) is tax liability.
17See Table 2 for an overview of the dependent, the control and the socio-demographic variables.
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on the construction of the adjusted income is provided in Table A.3.
The correlation coefficient between the tax price of giving and the net income confirms
medium sized correlation with a correlation coefficient of -0.596. Thus we assume, that we
can interpret estimated coefficients of price and income as partial effects.
In case of income- or price shocks triggering exceptional or one-time donations, estimat-
ing equation (2) might not deliver consistent elasticities. To disentangle those transitory
responses from persistent effects, panel data offers the inclusion of the income and price
growth rates from years surrounding the donation. Empirically, this extents equation (2) in
the following way:
Git = G (Yit − T (Xit),∆(Yit − T (Xit)),∆(Yit+1 − T (Xit+1)), Pit,∆Pit,∆Pit+1, zit) (3)
In order to control for transitory effects, we start with a strictly non-dynamic model that
only uses cross-sectional data following equation (2) in a log-log design, allowing to interpret
coefficients directly as elasticities:
git = α + β1pit + γ1yit + θ
′zit + it. (4)
with ln(Git) = git as the log of giving for taxpayer i at time t, pit is the log of the price
of the first donated Euro and yit is the log of the net income net taxes, it represents some
white noise error. β1, γ1 and θ′ are price, income elasticity and coefficient vector of socio-
demographic control variables of giving. This model is similar to Bönke et. al (2013) and
allows the comparison to their results.
Subsequently, we compute a quasi-dynamic specification that controls for the growth rate
of prices and incomes surrounding the donation. This enables us to compute next to the
permanent elasticities also transitory elasticities:
git = α + β1pit + β2∆pit + β3∆pit+1 + γ1yit + γ2∆yit + γ3∆yit+1 + θ
′zit + it (5)
where ∆ denominates the first difference such as ∆pit = pit − pit−1 and ∆pit+1 = pit+1 − pit.
As suggested by Bakjia and Heim (2011) this specification allows to differentiate between the
persistent price (income) elasticity β1 (γ1) and the transitory price (income) elasticity which
takes the form: β1 + β2 − β3 (γ1 + γ2 − γ3).18
The transitory price or income elasticity implies, how the donor would react to a temporary
18Bakjia and Heim compute more dynamic effects by adding another lagged difference for price and income
elasticities. Due to data limitations of the TPP our panel is too short to include extensive controls like Bakjia
and Heim (2011) in the estimation model.
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change of tax prices or income between periods t − 1 and t and a subsequential return in
t+ 1 to the level of t− 1. Note, that equation (5) demands assumptions regarding the future
income and price growth rates. In our preferred quasi-dynamic estimation approach we imply
perfect foresight, hence we assume the donor has complete knowledge of income and prices
that are actually realized in t+ 1. As a test of robustness, in a second scenario we relax the
assumption of perfect foresight and predict future incomes and prices with the information
available in t. Results for the model of imperfect foresight are presented in Table A.1 in the
appendix of this chapter.
Donations to charity are very heterogenous for given prices and income levels, promoting to
allow for a more heterogenous estimation technique that is not based on strong assumptions
about homogeneity. Therefore, following Feldstein and Lindsey (1981), Fack and Landaise
(2010) and Bönke et al. (2013) we allow price and income elasticities to depend on the
amount given to charity. Additionally, we observe heavy left censored observations with a
high fraction of taxpayers who do not donate. However, according to Randolph (1995), the
exclusion of the censored taxpayers would raise the issue of endogenous selection. Thus, fol-
lowing Boskin and Feldstein (1977) we assign a fictitious gift to all taxpayers by adding 1 Euro
to the donations of each taxpayer. Boskin and Feldstein (1977) also discuss the sensitivity of
the adjustments to charitable giving in the econometric context, promoting the use of 1 unit
as adjustment entity. Since estimated price and income elasticities refer to marginal changes,
this data modification poses only a minor influence. Given only the censoring problem, one
could easily implement a standard estimation technique such as the prominent Tobit model.
However, for suitable policy analysis the Tobit demands some form of homogeneity within
the error terms which could be violated given our heterogenous observations or a non-linear
data process. Moreover, we are interested in the shape of the distribution of giving, condi-
tional on price and income. Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) propose a well behaved three
step estimation procedure deploying quantile regressions which are able to derive efficient
estimates.19
Quantile regressions were first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and are a non-
parametric estimation technique. They allow for covariates to shift location, scale and shape
according to the dependent variables distribution. It has the advantage that the error term
only needs to obey the relative weak assumption of white noise with E[] = 0.20 Given that
the conditional quantile regressions can vary for different quantiles of the dependent variable,
19Efficient estimates are derived after performing two selection steps. Find a detailed description of the
procedure and an empirical application in their paper.
20In contrast to linear regression models, this approach does not require assumptions about the errors
distribution, variance and correlation of observations.
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it allows for heterogenous behavior and is robust to censoring.
According to Koenker and Hallock (2001), with respect to βq the sample regression quantiles












(1− q)|git −X ′itβq| (6)
Where the set of explanatory variables including pit, yit and zit are captured in matrix Xit.
Accordingly, the βq-vector comprises of coefficients described in equation (4) or (5) depending
on the chosen estimation equation including price and income elasticities.
Controlling for time effects, we use year dummies, additionally, we include socio-demographic
control variables such as age, age squared and dummy variables for children, church mem-




Due to data limitations, the majority of the literature is restricted to use control variables
from contemporary data. Usually, these studies rely on pooled cross sections (e.g. Bönke et
al. 2013). To assess, whether this non-dynamic approach yields reliable estimates of price and
income elasticities and to test our data, we treat the panel years as repeated cross sections
21A prominent case is the median regressor for q = 0.5, where the quantile regression estimator minimizes
the sum of absolute values of error.
22Since we use tax return data, we are limited to information relevant to a tax report. Hence, data irrelevant



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and estimate the model outlined in equation (4). The estimation results for the 0.35 until
0.99 quantile are displayed in Table 3. Since quantiles are sorted according to the size of
donations, quantiles 0 to 0.34 consist only of non-donors which are censored and quantile
regressions do not allow to compute the according effects.
We find that giving behavior is (very) heterogeneous and, therefore, our results confirm
the suitability of censored quantile regressions to detect that heterogeneity. Albeit signs of
coefficients do not change across quantiles, magnitudes vary significantly. Looking at the
influence of socio-demographic characteristics first, the coefficients show the expected signs:
The impact of children, marriage and age is positive; if the taxpayers pays church taxes (D
church=1), less is donated. This is plausible as church taxes are voluntary and are treated
by the German income tax code very similar to donations. Hence, paying a church tax is
likely to be regarded as a donation from the taxpayer’s perspective. Coefficients for the three
subsequent assessment years (D year1, D year2, D year3 with base year 2005) are negative
for all quantiles. Amongst others, these year effects are likely to capture two mayor events
boosting donations: First, in the summer of 2002, the flooding of the East German river
Oder.
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Table 3: Quantile regression results for pooled cross sections
Parameter Q = 0.35 Q = 0.40 Q = 0.45 Q = 0.5 Q = 0.55 Q = 0.6 Q = 0.65
C -13.31*** -12.22*** -11.41*** -10.59 *** -9.44*** -7.86*** -6.69***
yit 1.12*** 1.07*** 1.02*** 0.97*** 0.91*** 0.86*** 0.84***
pit -1.97*** -1.34*** -1.02*** -0.96*** -1.00*** -0.93*** -0.82***
D child 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.17***
D married 0.33*** 0.56*** 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.48*** 0.31*** 0.19***
D church -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.52*** -0.43*** -0.36***
Age 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04***
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 4.27*** 3.97*** 3.78*** 3.64*** 3.55*** 3.47*** 3.38***
Base year income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D West Germany 0.66*** 0.54*** 0.42*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.21***
D year1 -0.22*** -0.13*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05***
D year2 -0.46*** -0.35*** -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.19***
D year3 -0.17*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06***
Main income1 -0.02 0.00 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.15***
Main income2 -0.85*** -0.68*** -0.50*** -0.38*** -0.31*** -0.26*** -0.25***
Number of observations 2156937 2179630 2185528 2187696 2188925 2189514 2189759
Parameter Q = 0.70 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.8 Q = 0.85 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.95 Q = 0.99
C -5.92*** -5.33*** -4.84*** -4.32*** -3.67*** -2.48*** -0.66***
yit 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.77*** 0.72*** 0.70***
pit -0.77*** -0.77*** -0.77*** -0.81*** -0.91*** -1.15*** -1.43***
D child 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.06***
D married 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.13***
D church -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.18***
Age 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01***
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 3.30*** 3.20*** 3.08*** 2.92*** 2.72*** 2.37*** 1.89***
Base year income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D West Germany 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.05*** -0.01
D year1 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.08***
D year2 -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10***
D year3 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04***
Main income1 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.02*
Main income2 -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.19*** -0.07***
Number of observations 2189841 2189869 2189875 2189879 2189882 2189883 2189883
Note: Three-step censored quantile regression parameters estimates. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 replications,
asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***). Number of observations vary due to
the selection process accounting for the censoring.
Source: Own computation based on TPP 2001-2006.
Second, in late 2004 the tsunami hitting East Asia, causing donation to peek afterwards in
2004 and especially 2005. In sum, we find that our estimation yields similar results regarding
socio-demographic characteristics to previous studies (e.g. Bönke et al. 2013).
Estimates for income and price elasticities, yit and pit, pose the central results. Again, we
find estimates to vary across quantiles in a pattern reassembling Bönke et al. (2013) in
general, who found price elasticities between -1.44 and -0.45 and income elasticities 1.49 and
0.78. However, results differ in magnitude, especially regarding the price elasticity of giving.
This finding is important as Bönke et al. (2013) use different data. Unlike our data, they
draw on three cross sections which are representative for the whole population of German
taxpayers below incomes of 153,000 Euro. As mentioned above, the data we use might not be
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representative due to the balanced panel design and in addition highly over-samples taxpayers
with high incomes. Finding similar patterns to Bönke et al. (2013) therefore suggests that
we may draw valid general conclusions from our empirical exercise for giving behavior in
Germany.23
In order to present our central results in a more convenient manner, estimations displayed
in Table 3 for the elasticities of prices and incomes are rehashed in Figure 2 where the
quantile specific point estimates are represented by the solid lines and the grey shaded areas
denote the according confidence interval. We comment on the price elasticity pictured in
the left panel first. As mentioned above, results confirm the heterogenous behavior following
an inverse u-shaped pattern. This allows us to categorize taxpayers into three different
groups. (1) Price elastic contributors with estimates ranging from minus two to close to minus
one and comparably low donations (35th until 55th quantile); (2) price inelastic taxpayers
with contributions between the 60th and the 95th quantile; and (3) price elastic taxpayers
with contributions close to minus one and high contributions above the 95th quantile of the
distribution of charitable giving. Hence, we find the price elasticity to exceed one in absolute
value at the tails of the distribution. In sum, taxpayers with high amounts of charitable giving
confirm the prominent interpretations to be more sensitive to tax incentives as itemizing their
donations potentially results in a considerable tax relief and, hence, tax planning pays off.
In contrast, the behavior in the middle of the distribution of giving is rather price inelastic
with price elasticities below .8 in absolute values and tax incentives are not treasure efficient
(Feldstein 1975) to boost giving. Those medium donors are driven rather by income than by
tax incentives. The very price and income elastic behavior at the lower tail of the distribution
may reflect purposely decisions in case of rather small donations. According to theory, here
the marginal utility pay off is very high and thus prone to be elastic to changes in prices, tax
reliefs and income.
23Our data originates from the same source Bönke et al. (2013) use. However, the panel is designed to be
balanced per construction. Thus we are missing taxpayers with irregular income tax reports in our sample.
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Source: Own calculations based on TPP. Solid lines denote point estimates for the
respective quantile; grey areas denote the 95th confidence interval computed by
bootstrap.
The income elasticities pictured in the right panel of Figure 2 show heterogenous behavior
as well. Income elasticities are strictly downward sloping from an income elastic range (35th
until 45th quantile) with estimates exceeding one, a semi elastic range estimates where after
an initial steep decrease oscillate around .8 for medium to up to high donors. The income
effect on all is positive and high for all quantiles. Estimates for income elasticities are in line
with the theoretical assumption classifying giving as a normal good with decreasing marginal
utility, along the distribution of donors.
However, this non-dynamic approach does not exploit the panel structure of our data and
does not allow to disentangle persistent and transitory behavior from changes in prices or
incomes (e.g. transitory income shocks could be exceptional high (low) incomes through
short periods of unemployment or capital gains, transitory price shocks arise from temporary
law changes affecting the taxable income composition.)
5.2 Exploiting the Panel Structure
The indications from the non-dynamic specification are plausible and confirm previous find-
ings. However, only in a more dynamic set up one can validate, if the elasticities are indeed
linked to permanent responses and not biased from transitory effects. Indeed, to correctly
judge the treasure efficiency of tax incentives, the evaluation of the persistence effect is needed
and therefore, a more dynamic framework.
16
Table 4: Quantile regression results: quasi-dynamic model with perfect foresight
Parameter Q = 0.35 Q = 0.4 Q = 0.45 Q = 0.5 Q = 0.55 Q = 0.60 Q = 0.65
C -13.80*** -12.75*** -11.84*** -10.91*** -9.71*** -8.19*** -7.03***
yit 1.16*** 1.12*** 1.06*** 1.00*** 0.94*** 0.90*** 0.87***
∆yit -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.24***
∆yit+1 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.25***
yit transitory 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.38***
pit -2.16*** -1.44*** -1.06*** -1.00*** -1.07*** -1.00*** -0.88***
∆pit 0.92*** 0.54*** 0.41*** 0.46*** 0.64*** 0.58*** 0.47***
∆pit+1 -0.58*** -0.43*** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.29***
pit transitory -0.67*** 0.52*** -0.33*** -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.15 *** -0.11***
D child 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.16***
D married 0.31*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.30*** 0.18***
D church -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.52*** -0.44*** -0.36***
Age 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04***
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 4.19*** 3.89*** 3.71*** 3.58*** 3.48*** 3.40*** 3.33***
Base year income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
D West Germany 0.62*** 0.52*** 0.40*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.20***
D year1 -0.20*** -0.12*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05***
D year2 -0.44*** -0.35*** -0.28*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.19***
D year3 -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.08***
Main income1 -0.07*** -0.04*** 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.11***
Main income2 -0.86*** -0.69*** -0.51*** -0.39*** -0.33*** -0.28*** -0.27***
Number of observations 2149437 2176035 2184801 2187896 2189129 2189594 2189789
Parameter Q = 0.70 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.8 Q = 0.85 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.95 Q = 0.99
C -6.24*** -5.67*** -5.16*** -4.65*** -3.97*** -2.73*** -0.75***
yit 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.80*** 0.74*** 0.70***
∆yit -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.17*** -0.05***
∆yit+1 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.03***
yit transitory 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.62***
pit -0.83*** -0.83*** -0.85*** -0.92*** -1.03*** -1.33*** -1.58***
∆pit 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.28***
∆pit+1 -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.34*** -0.37*** -0.43*** -0.34***
pit transitory -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.16 *** -0.23*** -0.37*** -0.56*** -0.95***
D child 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.05***
D married 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.13***
D church -0.32*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.29*** -0.19***
Age 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01***
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 3.25*** 3.16*** 3.05*** 2.92*** 2.71*** 2.38*** 1.89***
Base year income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D West Germany 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.04*** -0.02*
D year1 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.09***
D year2 -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10***
D year3 -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04***
Main income1 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01 -0.04***
Main income2 -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.20*** -0.07***
Number of observations 2189861 2189876 2189879 2189882 2189883 2189883 2189883
Note: Three-step censored quantile regression parameters estimates. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 replications,
asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***). Number of observations vary due to
the selection process accounting for the censoring.
Source: Own computation based on TPP 2001-2006.
In the model specification in equation (5), the panel structure is exploited by integrating
lagged and future first differences for the price and the income elasticity and results are
presented in Table 4. With this approach we are able to disentangle giving behavior into
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reactions to persistent and transitory changes of income and prices. Thereby, responses
to transitory changes may include consumption smoothing, short-run timing, learning and
tax-planning behavior (Bakija and Heim, 2011). First difference including future prices and
incomes build on the assumption of perfect foresight, which implies that taxpayers know their
income and tax price of giving in the year following the donation. In this specification, pit
and yit denote the persistent price, respectively the persistent income elasticity, the responses
to transitory changes in income and prices are calculated as pit + ∆pit − ∆pit+1 and yit +
∆yit − ∆yit+1. The according sums are displayed in the respective lines transitory. Else,
socio-economic and time co-variates have a similar influence like in the non-dynamic set up.
Accordingly, we solely focus on the analysis of price and income elasticities. Again, we plot
the main results from our estimation to visualize the pattern over the quantiles which are
provided in Figure 3. The two upper graphs show results for pit and yit and are directly
comparable to Figure 2. However, we interpret them in this econometric setting as persistent
income and persistent price elasticities. Overall, the patterns for the persistent elasticities
reassemble the findings reported for the non-dynamic approach with price elastic behavior at
the tails of the distribution but price inelastic behavior for medium donors. The persistent
income elasticity shows again a downward sloping curve with elasticities exceeding one for the
lowest quantiles and elasticities below .8 for the top quantiles. The transitory elasticities are
depicted in the two lower panels of Figure 3. The estimates for the transitory price elasticity
are in absolute value (much) smaller than the permanent price elasticities. Furthermore, the
transitory price elasticity resembles the same inverse u-shaped pattern of their permanent
counterparts over the distribution of quantiles. The magnitude however differs substantially,
estimates are close to zero in absolute value for all quantiles but for the highest donors. The
transitory income elasticities are presented in the right lower panel of Figure 3. Showing a
reversed pattern to their permanent counterparts, they are all positive with values around
.4 for lower quantiles and increasing in the amount given. Estimates for the highest quantile
amount to .7. In sum, we find transitory income elasticities to be all well below one, with
the high donors to be relative more elastic than lower donors.
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Transitory Income Elasticity
Source: Own calculations based on TPP. Solid lines denote point estimates for the
respective quantile; grey areas denote the 95th confidence interval computed by
bootstrap.
To ensure robustness, we compare the estimates for price and income elasticities derived from
the quasi-dynamic specification with perfect foresight with three alternative approaches: the
non-dynamic specification presented above, a quasi-dynamic approach controlling for perma-
nent and transitory incomes (Table A.2) and a quasi-dynamic specification with imperfect
foresight (Table A.1). Comparing the estimates to our non-dynamic model first, we find,
both the permanent income and price elasticity show the same pattern and confirm results
from equation (4). While price elasticities tend to be slightly higher (in absolute value) in
this quasi-dynamic model, income elasticities are very similar. Overall, the patterns for the
persistence elasticities reassemble the findings reported for the non-dynamic approach. This
complements the hypothesis that high donors are more responsive to tax incentives than
medium donors and supports the usage of quantile regression. Although differences between
the models are marginal, the transitory component should not be neglected and especially
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high donors tend to react more elastic with regard to transitory changes in prices and in-
comes. The second test of sensitivity is the inclusion of a permanent and transitory income
component. Following standard approaches in the literature (e.g. Gottschalk and Moffitt
1994), permanent income is computed as the individual average over the whole panel length
and transitory incomes are the respective yearly deviations. Decomposing income into this
two components leaves the estimates for the permanent income elasticities and price elastici-
ties virtually unchanged, hence resembling the same pattern across quantiles and confirming
our preferred specification. Results and an detailed description of the empirical approach are
presented in Table A.2 in the appendix.
Comparing the preferred model to the third specification aims at testing the assumption of
perfect foresight. As mentioned above, results in Table 4 assume that taxpayers have complete
knowledge of future prices and incomes. To relax that somewhat strong assumption, we
perform an alternative scenario following Bakjia and Heim (2012), called imperfect foresight,
in which taxpayers know only on average their incomes and according prices in the future.
Estimates based on the imperfect foresight assumption are listed in Table A.1 and confirm
results from Table 4 with virtually unchanged permanent price and income elasticities for
most of the distribution. Only transitory income and price elasticities at the lower tail
increase in absolute value significantly and are greater than one in absolute values. Another
study based on the same data but relying on a different econometric modeling of donations
to charity is Adena (2014). Here, individual fixed effects estimation is employed. Estimating
the conditional mean of price and income elasticities, Adena’s (2014) results are unbiased
in case of no censoring. Then again, her results are robust against individual fixed effects,
while the interpretation of quantile regressions is hard once fixed effects are eliminated.24 In
short, Adena’s (2014) results complement our findings and imply that the price elasticity of
giving is heterogenous along the income distribution: low incomes are not price elastic with
relative small elasticities but medium and high incomes have a price elasticity greater one
(in absolute value). The income elasticity is rather constant for the income classes around .2
which is however, significantly smaller than our estimates. Adena’s (2014) results have direct
implications for the optimal design of the tax subsidization of donations within the German
tax code: the tax favoring of donations should depend on the income level of the taxpayer.
Only donations of taxpayers with incomes above 30,000 Euro should have lower prices than
one and receive a tax subsidy. Our results have different implications for the optimal design
24We believe that our results confirm that donations to charity are not strongly driven by individual fixed
effects. If taxpayers donations follow a fixed effect, those fixed effects are likely to be larger for high donors
than for small donors. That would contradict our inverse u-shaped pattern of the permanent price elasticity.
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of the tax subsidizes: the tax induced price of giving should hinge upon the amount given
rather than the tax rate which in turn is a progressive function of total income. Moreover,
our results confirm the consumption character of donations as normal good.
5.3 New donors
To close the circle, we now look how tax incentives are suited to activate new donors and
concentrate on the heterogeneity of donations at the extensive margin. This is especially
important if policy makers desire to broaden the base of donors.25 Therefore, we select a
sample of 640,134 observations (compared to about 2.2 million in the quasi-dynamic case)
consisting only of non-donors in a given year and re-estimate equation (4) for the subsequent
year. The results for the new donors are displayed in Table 5. Roughly 20% of taxpayers who
did not donate in a given year change their status from non-donors to donors in the subsequent
year, thus estimates start at the 80th quantile and go up to the 99th quantile (for the quasi-
dynamic model, the lowest quantile is the 35th). Comparing the results for these new donors
with the overall population of taxpayers reveals several differences. Comparing the results of
the control variables with estimation results from the quasi-dynamic model, coefficients for
socio-demographic characteristics (age, children, married, etc.) and assessment years exceed
the results from the quasi-dynamic case but exhibit the same sign. Again, we are most
interested in income and price elasticities. Estimates for price elasticities for the new donors
are all well below the absolute value of one and even insignificant for the 95th and 99th
quantile. The downward sloping pattern for income elasticities slightly mirrors the previous
findings: at the lower tale, donors exhibit income elastic behavior with estimates between
1.27 to 0.95 for quantiles .8 to .9 and semi elastic behavior at the very top. Hence it shows
clearly, that the propensity to become a donor is mostly income related. Thus, the policy
maker needs to consider that tax incentives are not suited to activate donors but only the
taxpayers income is. Winning taxpayers over to become donors obviously calls for other
instruments than price subsidization.
25Unlike in the US where most taxpayers donate, German taxpayers are less likely to donate. Our estimation
sample consists of 67.7% donors, which corresponds only to 55% of the weighted observations. This is in line
with Bönke et. al (2013) have 55% of donors in their representative sample.
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Table 5: Quantile regression results: new donors
Parameter Q = 0.8 Q = 0.85 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.95 Q = 0.99
C -11.22*** -9.95*** -6.27*** -4.65*** -3.34***
yit 1.27*** 1.15*** 0.95*** 0.93*** 0.91***
pit -0.51*** -0.86*** -0.47*** -0.07 -0.18
D child 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.10***
D married 0.56*** 0.69*** 0.11*** -0.10*** -0.14***
D church -0.28*** -0.35*** -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.31***
Age 0.00 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Age2 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 6.40*** 5.93*** 4.63*** 4.05*** 3.48
Base year income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00**
D West Germany -0.10*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
D year1 -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.06*** -0.02 0.03
D year2 -0.36*** -0.68*** -0.49*** -0.23*** -0.06*
D year3 -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.03
Main income1 0.61*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.27***
Main income2 -0.82*** -0.79*** -0.43*** -0.38*** -0.44***
Number of observations 638536 639527 640110 640131 640134
Note: Three-step censored quantile regression parameters estimates. Standard errors are bootstrapped with
200 replications, asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***).
Number of observations vary due to the selection process accounting for the censoring.
Source: Own computation based on TPP 2001-2006.
6 Conclusion
We apply the fairly new estimation technique of censored quantile regressions for the first
time in a balanced panel setting to investigate donation behavior with administrative income
tax data. The German taxpayer panel (TPP) itself is only recently available to researchers,
heavily over-samples high incomes and provides rich demographic information on nearly
one million taxpayers for six consecutive years. In addition and contrary to the bulk of
previous empirical studies on giving, censored quantile regressions allow to assume non-
constant price and income elasticities along the distribution of donors. Moreover, the panel
setting enables us to disentangle persistent from transitory effects. Altogether, we present
estimates for five specifications and perform in addition several tests of robustness. Based
on the whole population of donors, the preferred specification represents the quasi-dynamic
approach assuming perfect foresight regarding future prices and incomes. This quasi-dynamic
model is complemented by three alternative specifications: First, a non-dynamic approach
which does not utilize the panel structure but mirrors the procedure and data limitations of
previous studies. Second, a quasi-dynamic approach with imperfect foresight shedding some
light on the sensitivity of results with respect to the perfect foresight assumption. Third, a
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quasi-dynamic approach which includes a transitory and permanent income component and
thus serves as a robustness exercise for permanent and transitory responses. Last, the results
derived for the whole distribution of donors are complemented with estimates for new donors
by restricting the sample. All our modeling builds on the underlying theoretical assumption
that giving is a function of prices and income. Hence, a full dynamic approach which includes
giving as an autocorrelated process is not considered.
Our main results are derived from the quasi-dynamic specification with perfect foresight.
Estimates reveal giving behavior to be very heterogenous with coefficient estimates varying
substantially across the conditional distribution of donors. Hence, the adoption of censored
quantile regressions in this kind of econometric setting is justified and confirms previous
works that model giving behavior as heterogenous (e.g. Bönke et al. 2013, Fack and Landaise
2011). In case of persistent income elasticities, taxpayers in the lower conditional distribution
of donors show relatively high values in excision of one, while donors in the upper part of the
distribution qualify as inelastic. Thus, the downward sloping pattern of income elasticities
suggests that donations can be categorized as a normal consumption good, a finding which
is also supported by the transitory income elasticity oscillating around .4 for all quantiles.
Consequently, donations do not hinge on one-time income fluctuations but rather permanent
income changes. Of particular interest due to the direct policy implication for the design
of tax incentives are the price elasticities. Across the whole distribution of donors, the
permanent price elasticities imply only in parts an elastic behavior: tax incentives matter
at the very top and lower tail of the whole distribution of donors. Turning to Feldstein’s
(1975) rule of treasure efficiency, tax incentives are not efficient to boost giving behavior for
a substantial portion of donors in the middle of the distribution. For the new donors, we can
establish giving behavior not to be price elastic at all. All of the results above are robust
against alternative specifications, including the relaxation of taxpayers foresight on future
income and prices or the splitting income into a permanent and transitory component.
We complement the findings and policy recommendation of previous studies in several ways.
Amongst others, we extant the previous work by Bönke et al. (2013) and Fack and Landaise
(2011) and close a research gap by providing estimates for income and price elasticities in
a dynamic set up allowing for heterogonous responses. Of special interest in this matter
is the comparison between the quasi-dynamic approaches and the non-dynamic specification
which confirms, that estimates provided by previous cross-sectional studies not utilizing panel
information due to data limitations are not overly distorted. Then again, some recent panel
studies estimate average responses to tax incentives (e.g. Adena 2014, Bakija and Heim
2011). Following our findings, average price elasticities for the whole distribution give a
rather inaccurate picture. For example, estimators that provide average elasticities may be
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driven by behavioral responses of small parts in the distribution and may imply inaccurate
measure of treasure efficiency and optimality of tax incentive design. Confirming Bönke et
al. (2013) that giving behavior in Germany is price elastic at both tails of the distribution
of donors, tax incentives to boost giving behavior have to vary with the amount given and
not, as it is currently designed, with income. Hence, more ideal tax incentives have to take
the actual amount given into account. In addition, we provide estimates that show that the
current design of tax incentives is not likely to activate new donors. The propensity to give
is for new donors solely depending on income.
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8 Appendix
Table A.2 and Table A.2 provide alternative specifications and serve as robustness check for
quasi-dynamic approache. Results in Table 4 are based on perfect foresight, i.e. taxpayers
know their future income and their future price when itemizing their donating. To relax that
somewhat strong assumption, results in Table A.1 are based on imperfect foresight. As a
sensitivity analysis, taxpayers are only assumed to know their future income and price on
average. Following Bakija and Heim (2011), we predict the future income and price using
lagged incomes and prices as explanatory variables. Both these estimations have very strong
explanatory power with R2s above .9.
Results with impeferct foresight in Table A.1 strongly resemble results from perfect foresight
presented in Table 4. The estimates for the permanent income and the permanent price
elasticities remain virtually unchanged, so is the lagged income growth, the lagged price
growth and the control variables. The only noticeable difference are the estimated elasticities
of the future income and future price growth rate. The elasticities of the future income growth
are significantly smaller for the model with imperfect foresight for all quantiles. Moreover, all
quantiles but the first (.35) have negative elasticities of future income growth, which increases
the transitory income elasticity for the medium quantiles above one. The elasticity of the
future price growth is significantly larger for the model of imperfect foresight for all quantiles.
Estimates are now large and positive, especially for the lower tail resulting into transitory
price elasticities exceeding one in absolute value for quantiles between .35 and .5. All in
all, results for imperfect foresight appear much less smooth and transitory price elasticities
are unreasonable high at the lower tail. This could arise from the estimation process of the
future income and price, which might have low explanatory power at the lower tail.
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Table A.1: Quantile regression results from the dynamic model with imperfect foresight
Parameter Q = 0.35 Q = 0.4 Q = 0.45 Q = 0.5 Q = 0.55 Q = 0.60 Q = 0.65
C -13.58*** -12.44*** -11.50*** -10.54*** -9.36*** -8.02*** -6.90***
yit 1.13*** 1.09*** 1.04*** 0.99*** 0.94*** 0.89*** 0.87***
∆yit -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.30***
∆yit+1 0.15*** -0.02 -0.27*** -0.45*** -0.58*** -0.54*** -0.37***
yit transitory 0.71*** 0.81*** 1.02*** 1.15*** 1.22*** 1.12*** 0.94***
pit -2.07*** -1.37*** -1.10*** -1.10*** -1.21*** -1.17*** -0.99***
∆pit 1.14*** 0.65*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.49***
∆pit+1 2.18*** 2.58*** 1.69*** 0.90*** 0.11 -0.33*** -0.17 **
pit transitory -3.11*** -3.31*** -2.32*** -1.55*** -0.72*** -0.26*** -0.33***
D child 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.16***
D married 0.33*** 0.54*** 0.60*** 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.31*** 0.19***
D church -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.52*** -0.45*** -0.37***
Age 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 4.25*** 3.95*** 3.75*** 3.62*** 3.51*** 3.42*** 3.35***
Base year income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00***
D West Germany 0.64*** 0.54*** 0.40*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.20***
D year1 -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.16***
D year2 -0.48*** -0.38*** -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.19***
D year3 -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05***
Main income1 -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.12***
Main income2 -0.87*** -0.71*** -0.51*** -0.38*** -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.26***
Number of observations 2132841 2165267 2175345 2179841 2181960 2182821 2183158
Parameter Q = 0.70 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.8 Q = 0.85 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.95 Q = 0.99
C -6.09*** -5.52*** -5.04*** -4.52*** -3.88*** -2.64*** -0.70***
yit 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.74*** 0.70***
∆yit -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.20*** -0.07***
∆yit+1 -0.24*** -0.15*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.14***
yit transitory 0.81*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.70*** 0.78***
pit -0.89*** -0.85*** -0.83*** -0.87*** -0.97*** -1.27*** -1.55***
∆pit 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.42*** 0.33***
∆pit+1 -0.02 0.12* 0.18** 0.18*** 0.09 -0.06 -0.64***
pit transitory -0.41*** -0.52*** -0.57*** -0.65*** -0.68*** -0.79*** -0.58***
D child 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.05***
D married 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.13***
D church -0.32*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.29*** -0.20***
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01***
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 3.27*** 3.18*** 3.07*** 2.92*** 2.72*** 2.37*** 1.88***
Base year income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D West Germany 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.04*** -0.01*
D year1 -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.13***
D year2 -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10***
D year3 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.03***
Main income1 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02** -0.04***
Main income2 -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.20*** -0.07***
Number of observations 2183294 2183354 2189879 2189882 2189883 2189883 2189883
Note: Three-step censored quantile regression parameters estimates. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 replications,
asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***). Number of observations vary due to
the selection process, accounting for censoring.
Source: Own computation based on TPP 2001-2006.
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Results in Table A.2 employ an alternative strategy for identifying the persistent and tran-
sitory income elasticity. Following Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), we compute a permanent
income as the average income over our panel data with transitory income as the annual







Accordingly, the transitory income Y˜it for taxpayer i in period t is the yearly deviation from
the average income:
Y˜it = ln(Yit)− Yi
Results from Table A.2 are remarkable similar to the results from the preferred specification
in Table 4. Estimates for the permanent income elasticity Yi are only somewhat larger than
the estimates for the persistent income elasticities yit in Table 4 and show the same downward
sloping trend. Transitory income elasticities Y˜it in Table A.2 also follow the same pattern
like the transitory income elasticities in Table 4.
Results for the price elasticity are somewhat smaller in magnitude than from the preferred
specification and resemble the price elasticities from the non-dynamic model.
26Note that our data contain six straight years. However, results are not sensitive when estimating the
permanent income on basis of less years.
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Table A.2: Quantile regression results from model with permanent and transitory income
Parameter Q = 0.35 Q = 0.40 Q = 0.45 Q = 0.5 Q = 0.55 Q = 0.6 Q = 0.65
C -14.46*** -13.17*** -12.20*** -11.34*** -10.26*** -8.58*** -7.39***
Yi 1.22*** 1.16*** 1.10*** 1.04*** 0.99*** 0.93*** 0.90***
Y˜it 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29***
pit -1.85*** -1.24*** -0.92*** -0.84*** -0.90*** -0.83*** -0.72***
D child 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.16***
D married 0.31*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.30*** 0.17***
D church -0.58*** -0.57*** -0.55*** -0.53*** -0.51*** -0.43*** -0.35***
Age 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04***
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 4.17*** 3.87*** 3.70*** 3.58*** 3.48*** 3.40*** 3.32***
Base year income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00
D West Germany 0.62*** 0.52*** 0.39*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.19***
D year1 -0.01 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11***
D year2 -0.35*** -0.26*** -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.11***
D year3 -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02***
Main income1 -0.07*** -0.05*** 0.04*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.12***
Main income2 -0.81*** -0.67*** -0.49*** -0.37*** -0.30*** -0.25*** -0.23***
Number of observations 2146623 2176918 2185852 2188547 2189451 2189738 2189832
Parameter Q = 0.70 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.8 Q = 0.85 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.95 Q = 0.99
C -6.61*** -6.06*** -5.59*** -5.12*** -4.46*** -3.27*** -1.03***
Yi 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.73***
Y˜it 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.55***
pit -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.70*** -0.75*** -0.87*** -1.14*** -1.42***
D child 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.05***
D married 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.12***
D church -0.30*** -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.19***
Age 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01***
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D limit 3.24*** 3.15*** 3.05*** 2.91*** 2.71*** 2.38*** 1.87***
Base year income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
D West Germany 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.01*
D year1 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.06*** -0.03***
D year2 -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.07***
D year3 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01 -0.01* -0.02***
Main income1 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.02** 0.01 -0.03***
Main income2 -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.06***
N 2189872 2189882 2189883 2189883 2189883 2189883 2189883
Note: Three-step censored quantile regression parameters estimates. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 replications,
asterisks denote the respective significance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***). Number of observations vary due to
the selection process, accounting for censoring.
Source: Own computation based on TPP 2001-2006.
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Table A.3: Net income
Income from business activity
(including income from agriculture and forestry, from unincorporated business enterprise and from
self-employed activities)
+ wage income, income from renting and leasing and other income
+ earnings from capital investments (imputation of missing data on an average level)
+ all tax reliefs and tax allowances for income from business activity as far as identifiable
+ allowable expenses for wage and other income (consumptive character)
+ age relief
+ tax-exempted income from foreign countries
+ loan and income indemnification
+ life annuity income less income component (flat 70% of life annuity income)
+ tax shelters: losses from equity holdings
+ losses from business activity income and renting and leasing income, if the modified income class
and the sum of income until this point is still negative (negative consumption is not possible)
- fixed income tax and solidarity surcharge
- alimony / child support
+ child benefit
= Net Income (net-of-tax adjusted gross income)
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